Try this "short" explanation: (from Pravda Gerashchenko)
Belarusian potash, Lukashenko's maneuvering between Moscow and Beijing, and what does Traber - Putin's friend arrested with his approval - have to do with all this?
I translated for you a shortened version of the post from the "Nezygar" Telegram channel.
I think it's interesting.
"One of the themes behind Lukashenko's recent diplomatic maneuvering between Moscow and Beijing may be Belarusian potash.
After the imposition of harsh sanctions, Belarus lost its Baltic transit through Klaipėda (Lithuania) and was forced to redirect millions of tons of its potash fertilizers to Russian ports. For decades, Ilya Traber ('Antikvar') has been one of the most influential yet shadowy figures in the port business of northwestern Russia, controlling or developing the region's major deep-water and logistics hubs (including projects in Ust-Luga, Primorsk, and Vyborg).
After the closure of Baltic transit through Klaipėda, Minsk distributed its 11.6 million tons of potash as follows: 50% went through the Bronka multipurpose transshipment complex (located in the Great Port of St. Petersburg, where Traber's position has been historically strong since the 1990s), and 25% - through the port capacities of Ust-Luga, whose development is inextricably linked to Traber's influence.
Given that potash exports are the main source of foreign currency revenue for the Lukashenko regime, any large-scale redistribution of spheres of influence, audit, or forceful intervention in the Baltic port system directly affects Belarusian logistics. Traber's demonstrative arrest by forces from the FSB's central office and Russia's Investigative Committee shows that the Kremlin is taking the country's key sea gates under strict, direct control.
For Minsk, this is an unambiguous signal: transshipment terms, pricing, and the very possibility of exporting Belarusian fertilizers now depend entirely on decisions made by the federal center, which leaves Lukashenko with no room to maneuver and ties his economy to Moscow's whims.
For Lukashenko, there are no longer any 'authoritative intermediaries' or private players in the region with whom Minsk could negotiate behind the scenes regarding discounts, grey schemes, or ways to circumvent tariffs. The entire port system of the Leningrad region is coming under the direct, 100% control of the Kremlin and state law enforcement agencies.
But why was it decided to 'send a signal' to Lukashenko now? Because not long ago, the US lifted sanctions on Belarusian potash. Trump's interest is twofold: to lower fertilizer prices for American farmers and to create 'soft leverage' to pressure Putin through Minsk. However, the US has run into a logistical impasse. Washington is currently putting significant pressure on Lithuania (the port of Klaipėda) and Poland, demanding that they open transit for Belaruskali through EU ports.
While Lukashenko is trying to negotiate with the US for a return to Baltic ports, his potash is physically being shipped through the Leningrad region. The arrest of Ilya Traber and the FSB's harsh takeover of the port system are the Kremlin's preemptive countermeasure. Moscow is sending a clear message to Lukashenko: 'gray' schemes, maneuvering, and backroom deals in the Baltic region are over. Until the EU reopens its ports, Minsk's potash exports are completely in the grip of Russian intelligence agencies, which blocks any attempts by Lukashenko to play a separate game with Trump.
Realizing that Trump cannot yet help lift European sanctions, and with Russia suffocating him in its embrace at Valdai, Lukashenko is heading to Beijing. China is the second-largest buyer of Belarusian potash and views Belarus as a key hub of the Silk Road. For Minsk, the trip to China is an attempt to find a political and financial counterweight to pressure from the Kremlin, to secure potash sales to Asian markets, and to obtain geopolitical 'backing' from Xi Jinping in case the conflict with Moscow enters a critical phase."
Sacré moustache tenu par les couilles
